ABSTRACT As a promising future Internet architecture, information-centric networking (ICN) takes the content as the focal point while shifting away from the traditional host-centric paradigm. The content-oriented feature and in-network caching from ICN enable new economic or pricing models among Internet service provider (ISP), content provider (CP), and users. The current pricing models in ICN usually focus on that users directly pay the content price to the CP, which leaves the ISPs out of the payment processes, resulting in ISP's reluctance to deploy ICN. Furthermore, the existing models largely ignore the interaction between the pricing strategy and user consumption behaviors, such as choosing cheaper ISPs or giving up the acquisition of the content with high prices. In order to design a collaborative pricing framework to prompt ISP's deploying ICN, we first develop a content acquisition scheme in conjunction with the lump-sum and retail strategies for ICN. Within this scheme, a user consumption model to characterize the user's behaviors in using the Internet and the utility function for all ICN entities, including the CP, access ICN, and transit ICN, are formulated to maximize the revenues of all entities. Our extensive analysis and numerical results show that the proposed collaborative pricing framework significantly outperforms the existing scheme in joint caching and pricing strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Cisco's report, global IP traffic will increase nearly threefold over the next 5 years [1] . In order to handle the increasing demands for video content over the Internet and find new approaches to provide better delivering services for the large volume of information, the Internet architecture based on named data objects has been proposed by the academic community, which is commonly referred to as Information-Centric Networking (ICN) [2] . In ICN, taking the content as the first-class citizen is in line with the emerging trend that the users are just interested in the content itself rather than where is the content and how to obtain the content. An important feature of ICN is the optional in-network caching deployed on routers or servers [3] - [6] . With in-network caching, users can directly receive the content from the nearby content caching routers, which can improve the efficiency of content distribution and make ICN a promising candidate for delivering network services in the fifth generation land mobile communication system (5G) [7] .
In-network caching in ICN can bring benefits to the users, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and content provider (CP). For users, caching content on the nearby routers can shorten the latency in obtaining the content, thereby improving the quality of experience (QoE) . From the perspective of the ISPs, in-network caching can cut down the volume of network traffic and reduce ISP's bandwidth consumption.
Similarly, for the CP, requests can be satisfied from the on-path caching routers, which can decrease the load on the CP, save bandwidth resources, and avoid network congestions. More importantly, when CP is temporarily offline, the built-in content caching in the network can continue to provide the content to users, which enhances the robustness of the network.
As the in-network caching plays an important role in ICN, the academics have paid great attention to the content caching and distribution. An important consensus is that different ICN entities must collaborate to improve the performance of the entire network. However, ICN entities (e.g., the access ICN, transit ICN and content provider) are reluctant to cache or forward data or even deploy ICN when they cannot get profits. Hence, for the sake of boosting the content distribution and sharing, it's necessary to find out a suitable win-win economic framework for all entities.
In the traditional business model, CPs produce many content objects and charge subscribers, while access ICN and transit ICN get the revenue from transmission services [8] . However, if ICNs have deployed infrastructures with built-in caching capacity, it's possible for ICNs to distribute the content distribution on behalf of CPs. In this way, ICNs can make additional profits through providing the content from their content caching store, which can be implemented through the lump-sum strategy.
With the lump-sum strategy, the access ICN and transit ICN pay a large amount on a single occasion (rather than smaller amounts on multiple separate occasions under the retail strategy) to the CP, cache the content in their own content stores, and sell the content to subscribers independently. With this lump-sum strategy, ICNs can get revenues not only from traffic delivery but also from cached content objects. Usually, with the retail strategy, the CP needs to pay ISPs or advertisers for peddling its content. However, under the lump-sum strategy, the CP doesn't have to take these costs while guaranteeing its profits by charging the one-off payment.
In this work, we study how to efficiently make both the retail and lump-sum strategies coexist in ICN while deriving win-win pricing strategies to maximize the revenues for all ICN entities. In particular, we investigate how to determine the pricing strategies of ICNs; whether the utilities for different entities can be guaranteed for given pricing strategies; how the pricing strategy of the access ICN impacts the consumption behavior of subscribers; and how the pricing strategy and user consumption behavior interact. We develop the content acquisition scheme combined with both retail and lump-sum strategies for access ICN and transit ICN. A user consumption model is proposed to characterize the consumption behavior of users. Furthermore, within the content acquisition scheme, the utility function combined with user consumption behavior is established to maximize the revenues of all the entities. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We develop a content acquisition scheme in conjunction with the lump-sum and retail strategies for ICN. The economic interactions among ICN entities and users are effectively considered in the scheme.
• A user consumption model is proposed to describe the user's behavior in using the Internet, which is integrated into the pricing strategies.
• Win-win pricing strategies for all ICN entities are derived based on the proposed utility function and the user consumption model.
• Through simulation, the interactions between pricing and revenue among different ICN entities are analyzed. The impacts of different pricing strategies on each entity's revenue are also analyzed and compared with the Joint Caching and Pricing Strategies (JCPS) scheme. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the related work. Section III presents the proposed collaborative framework. Collaborative pricing strategies of all ICN entities are proposed in Section IV. Section V shows the numerical results. Conclusions and future work are presented in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Much research has been done to improve the revenues of ISPs at a global scale in current Internet and Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) [9] - [13] . However, the pricing strategies of CDNs cannot be directly applied to ICNs due to the lack of collaboration between different CDNs. Therefore, research works have focused on the collaboration between different ICNs, which can be broadly classified as: economic incentives, cost reduction and pricing based mechanisms. The works based on economic incentives usually define a series of rewards or penalties while the schemes of cost reduction try to minimize the capital expenditure (CAPEX) and/or operating expenditure (OPEX). The studies on pricing mainly investigate the strategies for pricing and changing the prices of goods and services to obtain better return.
Rajahalme et al. [14] conducted one of the earliest studies on economic incentives in ICN when they observed that content sources in the top level (such as access ICNs or transit ICNs) are not willing to cooperate with other entities, due to the lack of revenues. Agyapong and Sirbu [15] analyzed the incentive schemes for different ICN entities. Araldo et al. [16] considered the cost of content retrieval, which is defined as the cost associated with the external bandwidth needed by an ISP to retrieve content. The authors proposed two optimization models that either minimize the overall costs or maximize the hit ratio. The work in [17] designed a cost-aware (CoA) cache decision policy, which more likely stores the content objects that the ISP has to retrieve through the expensive links, to reduce the operational costs of ISPs. Pham et al. [18] suggested that the payment flow should be from access or transit ICN to the CP, where the CP sets the content price and ICNs need to pay the CP for obtaining the content. Mohammad et al. proposed a cooperative cache pricing strategy in [19] , which pays more attention to the popular content. In [20] , an economic model was proposed to study pricing strategies under dynamic caching policies. In this model, users only pay the content price to the CP, where access and transit ICNs only forward data.
However, all the aforementioned works primarily focused on how users directly pay the content price to the CP, whereas the payoff of ICNs is limited with providing connections or data transmission. As a result, ISPs are less motivated to deploy or improve ICN infrastructures. In this work, we develop utility functions and win-win pricing strategies for all ICN entities while maximizing the revenues for all entities. Particularly, we design a collaborative pricing framework which focuses on the following four aspects: 1) We develop a content acquisition scheme, which takes both retail and lump-sum strategies into consideration. 2) The interaction between pricing strategy and user consumption behavior is analyzed and incorporated into the network model. 3) We develop utility functions for all ICN entities to derive win-win pricing strategies. 4) We analyze and evaluate the proposed schemes through extensive experiments.
III. COLLABORATIVE PRICING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the proposed collaborative pricing framework. Within this framework, we propose a scheme, called Content Acquisition with Retail and Lump-sump (CARL) for ICNs. The framework also formulates the economic interactions among all entities and users in the ICN, the user consumption model to characterize the user's behaviors in using the Internet and the utility function for all ICN entities to maximize the revenues of all ICN entities.
A. CONTENT ACQUISITION WITH RETAIL AND LUMP-SUM (CARL) STRATEGIES
In the collaborative pricing framework, we propose the content acquisition scheme, which takes advantages of both retail and lump-sump pricing strategies. In the traditional business model, users directly pay the content price to the CP, which limits the ISP's revenues in providing connections and result in ISP's reluctance to deploy ICN. Hence, for better motivating ISPs to deploy ICN, both retail and lump-sum strategies are adopted for access/transit ICN to fetch the content. The lump-sum strategy means that the ICNs purchase and cache the content from the CP with a single payment. Then, users can purchase the content from ICNs and no longer pay any money to the CP. It is worth noting that once an ICN makes a lump sum payment to the CP for the content, the content requests at that ICN will not be reported to the CP. However, for the retail strategy, all the content requests are forwarded to the CP and the content payment will be delivered to the CP.
B. ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS
An instance of the network model is depicted in Fig. 1 , which consists of two access ICNs, one transit ICN, one CP and a number of users. These four types of network entities play different roles in the ICN, whereas CPs produce content objects; the transit ICNs provide wide-area transport services for access ICNs and indirectly provide the content for users; the access ICNs provide access services or content for the connected users; and users consume the content.
As the network is asymmetric, each entity M may have its own pricing strategy, which consists of four parts: 1) the network price for delivering the content; 2) the storage price for satisfying requests from its own content store; 3) the content VOLUME 6, 2018 price that users need to pay for a content; 4) and the total price that ICN M needs to pay for purchasing the content from the CP. Note that the retail strategy will have the first three parts involved and the price is calculated per data unit. The lump-sum strategy will have all four parts involved and the last one refers to the single payment.
In the network model, the content caching proportion adopted by each entity is represented by the parameter θ (θ ∈ [0, 1]). Specifically, θ K ,M denotes the portion of the content demand of ICN K(K∈ {A, B}) that is satisfied at entity M . Furthermore, we use P M _net , P M _sto , and P M _con to represent the network price, storage price and content price, respectively. Accordingly, the price that ICN M charges per data unit can be denoted by P M = P M _net + P M _sto + P M _con and the single lump-sum payment is P o M . As shown in Fig. 1, P A , Similarly, the pricing strategy for the CP can be derived, which includes three parts: (1) the lump-sum content price paid by access and transit ICNs; (2) the storage price for offering the content from the CP's local store; and (3) the content payment from retail users.
As depicted in Fig. 1 , when customers use the services provided by access ICN K, P K will be paid to ICN K by the customers. If satisfying content requests from a transit ICN, ICN K will get a payment as P K _sto + P K _con . Transit ICN C charges access ICN K the payment of P c , if it caches or forwards the content that ICN K requests. For the CP, there are two cases which can coexist: (1) CP charges the one-off payment P o M when ICNs cache the content; and (2) CP charges price P O_con + P O_sto if the transit ICN forwards the content request to the CP. In addition to those symbols mentioned above, more notations are presented in Table 1 . 
C. USER CONSUMPTION MODEL
Following the user request model in [21] , we assume that the number of users that may request the content from access ICN K is a function of the charged price. This function should be non-increasing and convex. In other words, when the price increases, there is less customers requesting the content. However, the decreasing speed of the customer numbers slows down with the increase of the price, as shown in Eq.(1):
In Eq. (1), N K _init denotes the initial number of users connecting to ICN K. The parameter E K in this function presents the QoE of the consumer. The content with higher quality of service is often deemed to provide a better QoE. As one can see from Eq. (1), when ICN K provides service for free, all the customers may desire to send requests to K. Conversely, if ICN K charges an infinite price, nobody may request the content from K. Since QoE is related to the specific content details and out of the scope of this study, we hereafter focus on the interaction between pricing and consumption behaviors of users.
Generally, a customer may prefer requesting the content from the initial access ICN rather than switching to another one when the price increases a little but does not exceed a threshold value ρ(ρ ≥ 1), i.e., threshold value of price ratio between the two access ICNs. When the price ratio between the two access ICNs exceeds the threshold ρ, customers will be more likely to switch to the ICN that charges lower for the requested content. We use N A,B to denote the number of users that originally connect to ICN A and then switch to ICN B, as shown in Eq. (2) .
According to Eq. (2), the lower ICN A charges, the less customers may switch to other access ICNs. Similarly, the higher ICN B charges, the less customers will switch to B. However, if the access ICN sets a high price that users cannot afford it, users will give up the content requests. The number of users who give up the content requests can be as the following:
where N A_real is the real number of customers that initially connect to access ICN A and continuously use the service provided by ICN A (without switching to other ICNs), as shown in Eq. (4) .
Accordingly, Eq. (5) can be used to define the total number of customers who request the content from ICN A.
In Eq. (5), N B,A represents the number of users who transfer from ICN B to ICN A. Similarly, the total number of customers of ICN B can be derived. In this proposed model, each entity tries to accept more users to maximize its own revenues, which may result in an explicit conflict between different access ICNs. Therefore, it is essential to analyze the relationship between pricing strategies of different entities (as to be described in next section).
D. UTILITY FUNCTION
In the network model, the revenue of an entity can be represented by a utility function. With both lump-sum and retail pricing strategies, each access ICN preferentially uses the content cached in local store to satisfy user requests. When the requested content doesn't exist in local store, user requests will be forwarded to other entities. If the total number of data units requested by user u is Q u , then the utility function of access ICN A is given as Eq. (6).
In Eq. (6), the first term denotes the sum of the revenue obtained by satisfying user requests through its local store and the revenue gained by forwarding user requests. The second term denotes the utility gained when ICN A satisfies a portion of ICN B's user requests forwarded by transit ICN C. The last term P o A is the lump-sum price that ICN A pays to the CP. Similarly, utility of ICN B can be defined as follows:
where θ B,OUT =1−θ B,B . Transit ICN C gets its revenues when it provides transmission services for access ICNs or indirectly provides the content for users. Its utility function can be modeled as Eq. (8):
The first two terms in Eq. (8) represent the revenues that ICN C gets by caching the content requested by users. The third and fourth terms denote the revenues obtained by forwarding the content for users of ICN A and B, respectively. The last term represents the lump-sum payment paid by ICN C for purchasing the content from the CP. Similarly, the utility function of the CP can be expressed as in Eq. (9) .
In Eq. (9), the first term denotes the one-off payment from the ICNs. The second and third terms represent the revenues that come from retailing the content to the customers of ICN A and B, respectively.
IV. COLLABORATIVE PRICING FOR IN-NETWORK CACHING
The utility functions of different ICN entities can be modeled as a three-tier game and the top-down components are the content provider, transit ICN and access ICNs. In order to identify the pricing strategies for access ICNs, we calculate the partial derivatives of ICN A and B, and solve Eq. (10).
Due to the limitation of space, we omit the detailed procedure for solving the derivatives in Eq. (10). In the solving process, we assume that both the transit ICN's price and the CP's price, the number of users, and the number of data units are set to constants. If all the contents have the same user experience degree E and users request the same number of contents Q, then the solutions of Eq. (10) are shown in Eq. (11) .
Accordingly, we can obtain the second partial derivatives of access ICN A's utility, as shown in Eq. (12) .
In Eq. (12), parameters coef 1 and coef 2 can be expressed as coef 1 = N A * min [1, 
P C can be obtained by solving the differential equation in Eq. (13) . P C is related to the storage price P O_sto and the data unit price P O_con charged by the CP. By analyzing the prices in Eq. (9), we can see that if the content is indirectly acquired from the CP, transit ICN will pay the price P O_sto + P O_con to the CP. In order to ensure that access ICNs can get profits, P O_sto + P O_con should satisfy the constraint in Eq. (14) .
P O_sto + P O_con ≤ P A_sto + P A_con P O_sto + P O_con ≤ P B_sto + P B_con (14) Therefore, P O_sto + P O_con has an upper bound as shown in Eq. (15) .
The utility function in Eq. (6) shows that ICN A can get profits when the total revenue of ICN A is greater than its total expenditure. Hence, the upper bound of the total price paid by ICN A to the CP can be derived. Similarly, the total content prices P o B and P o C paid by ICN B and C are also solvable. Once the price of the content provider is identified, we can get the optimal pricing strategy through multiple iterations of the above processes until the norm of the pricing is derived.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We simulate and evaluate our schemes in a three-tier network scenario as shown in Fig. 1 ρ and no users are triggered to switch ICNs. When futher increasing ICN A's price, users of ICN A will switch to ICN B or give up the content requests. As a result, the number of users accessing B slightly increases and then gets saturated when the threshold is greater than 1.
B. THE IMPACT OF THE TRANSIT ICN's PRICE AND CP's PRICE
According to the proposed model, the prices of access ICNs are correlated with the price of transit ICN C. When the CP sells some contents in the form of retail, or user requests cannot be satisfied by the content store in the transit ICN, access ICNs' prices will be greatly influenced by the transit ICN. As shown in Fig. 3 , when the price of the transit ICN gradually increases, the access ICNs' prices increase linearly. However, when transit ICN and access ICNs set high prices, the numbers of users at access ICNs will decrease. Fig. 4 shows the impact of the CP's price on access ICNs' prices. When the CP sells the content with a retail strategy, the CP's price will have a direct impact on the revenue of the transit ICN C, thus affecting the prices of access ICNs. When the CP sells content with a lump-sum strategy, the CP's price will have a direct impact on the revenues of the access ICNs and the prices of access ICNs. As a result, access ICNs' prices increase linearly with the increase of the CP's price. Fig. 5(a) shows how the access ICN A's price affects its utility function. One can see that access ICN A cannot obtain profits if the price of ICN A is much lower than ICN C. When the price ratio between ICN A and B is lower than the threshold value ρ and with the increase of ICN A's price, the utility of ICN A increases gradually. However, when the ICN A demands a high price that the value in Eq.(1) approaches zero, the utility of ICN A decreases. In this case, users may choose to give up requesting the content. The utility of ICN gradually approaches zero when the price further increases. Fig. 5(b) shows how the pricing of ICN C affects the utility of ICN A. The results show that when the prices of access ICNs are larger than that of the transit ICN, access ICNs can obtain higher revenues. As the transit ICN gradually increases its price, its utility will decrease. When the price of ICN C increases to be larger than that of ICN A, access ICNs will no longer be profitable. Fig. 6 shows how the CP's retail price and lump-sum price affect utilities of different ICN entities. Since both access ICNs and the transit ICN have similar characteristics when varying the CP's price, we only demonstrate the utility of the transit ICN. As shown in the figure, under either the lumpsum or retail strategy, user demands will decrease gradually with the increase of the CP's price, leading to the decrease of utilities for ICNs. Similarly, the utility of the CP will increase when the pricing of CP satisfies the constraint in Eq. (15) . However. when the CP's price increases futher, user demands will decrease significantly.
C. THE IMPACT OF ACCESS ICNs' PRICES AND THE TRANSIT ICN's PRICE

D. THE IMPACT OF CP's PRICE
E. COMPARISON BETWEEN CARL AND JCPS
We compare the performance of the proposed Content Acquisition with Retail and Lump-sump (CARL) scheme with the JCPS scheme in [20] . Studies have showed that content popularity follows the Zipf's law and the content with higher popularity is more likely to be requested. Hence, the retail strategy and lump-sum strategy in the proposed CARL scheme adopt Pareto principle for the relevant relationship between Zipf's law and Pareto principle [22] . Accordingly, 80 percent of content replicas are carried out through the retail strategy and 20 percent of content replicas are transacted through the lump-sum strategy. Fig. 7 shows the results when the number of content replicas varies from 100 to 9000. The curves show that the proposed CARL scheme outperforms the JCPS scheme in terms of the utilities of the access ICNs and transit ICN. This is primarily due to the lump-sum strategies adopted by CARL.
Interestingly, when the number of content replicas is further increased, CARL shows more advantages over JCPS in terms of the utilities of the access ICNs and transit ICN. Such advantages gradually disappears for the CP's utility with the increase of content replicas. This is largely due to the fact that, after paying the lump-sum payment, access or transit ICNs satisfy some content requests, which brings higher revenues for ICNs. Similarly, the CP can get profits from the lump-sum payment. Hence, the combination of retail strategy and lump-sum strategy can present a win-win scenario for both ICNs and the CP. Furthermore, any entity in the network maliciously bids will not get awarded, but will reduce the revenue of the whole network. Therefore, in order to maximize the benefits of all the entities in the network, different ICN entities must collaborate to set the pricing strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented the collaborative pricing framework for the in-network caching in ICN. For access and transit ICNs, we have proposed to combine the lump-sum and retail strategies while considering the interaction between pricing strategy and user consumption behaviors. As users will choose cheaper ICNs or give up requesting the content with high price, so a user consumption model is developed to characterize the impact of access ICN's price on user consumption. Based on the user consumption model, the utility function for each entity are derived and the win-win pricing strategies for different entities are developed. Our extensive simulation results have shown that the collaborative pricing strategies in the proposed Content Acquisition with Retail and Lump-sump (CARL) scheme can maximize the profits for all entities and significantly outperforms the existing JCPS scheme.
In future work, we will design a pricing guidance mechanism to guide the setting of the initial pricing. The guidance mechanism will be able to avoid the situation that some entities cannot get enough revenues because of a huge difference caused by the non-cooperative game pricing. In addition, we will also investigate how the methodology and results can be extended to multiple CPs and transit ICNs. He has published over 100 papers and held six patents. His research interests are in future Internet, mobile Internet, network management, and network security. VOLUME 6, 2018 
